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Several approaches divide empathy into emotional and cognitive 
subparts. The emotional reactions are strongly related to the 
mirror neuron system and interact with cognitive processes as 
the theory of mind. The aim of this review is to investigate the 
relationship between empathy and emotions. For this reason the 
review focuses on the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), because 
it is involved in empathy, emotion regulation, and self-conscious 
emotions. Overall, it can be concluded that mPFC distinguishes 
between self-generated emotions and empathy-generated 
emotions based on a self-other distinction. These findings 
suggest a shared network of empathy, emotion regulation and 
self-conscious emotions in cortical regions.
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INTRODUCTION
Social affective cognitive neuroscience is a relatively new branch of neuroscience 
with growing interest to the public. It focuses on the role of emotions in a social 
context.  However, brain functions in social situations are also influenced by cognitive 
processes. It remains to be specified how these cognitive processes are connected 
to emotional reactions during social events. Concerning empathy, several theories 
suggest a two stream model divided into emotional and cognitive routes (de Waal, 
2008; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008; Decety, 2011).  During emotional empathy, the 
emotion of another person is simulated automatically in the observer by activating 
limbic structures responsible for the given emotion. Considering that emotional
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empathy and emotions recruit the same macro-anatomical regions it is an ongoing 
discussion whether these processes share neural populations or even single neurons 
(Decety, 2011; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008; Csibra, 2007). In general, single neurons 
which are similarly active in observing and performing an action are known as 
mirror neurons. This creates the possibility of understanding the movements of 
others automatically because the observed action directly activates the equivalent 
motor response in the observer.
 Although it is well documented that mirror neurons exist for motor behavior 
(Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008) it remains to be specified in how far mirror neurons 
contribute to the understanding of emotions in empathy.
 Nevertheless, empathy is not a pure mirroring mechanism. For example, 
if two persons collaborate in a card game and a frowning face is presented, an 
empathic reaction will be evoked, signaled by a medial frontal negativity (MFN). By 
contrast, if the two persons have a competing relation, the same facial expression 
evokes a much stronger MFN, demonstrating a different evaluation of the affective 
state (Yamada, Lamm, & Decety, 2011). This example illustrates how cognitive 
processes change automatic reactions to other peoples’ emotions. Still, it remains to 
be analyzed which cognitive processes are the basis of these phenomena.
 Regarding cognitive processes in empathy, the main theories have focused 
on the interaction between the Theory of Mind (TOM), perspective taking and 
emotional empathy (de Waal, 2008; Decety, 2011). Nevertheless, empathy is not the 
only mechanism in which emotions and cognition interact. Other processes such 
as emotion regulation or self-conscious emotions also depend on emotional and 
cognitive information. So far, there exists no coherent overview on how empathy is 
related to other cognitive-emotional processes.
 To extend the existing theories, the current review will examine cognition-
emotion interactions in empathy, self-conscious emotions and emotion regulation. 
Furthermore, it will discuss the possibility of an emotional mirror neuron system 
(MNS) and its connection to cognition.To restrict the amount of information this 
review will focus on one region of interest, namely the medial prefrontal cortex 
(mPFC) as it contributes to facial perception (Mattavelli, Cattaneo, & Papagno, 
2011), emotion regulation (Kim & Hamann, 2007), empathy and the TOM (Decety 
& Jackson, 2004; Keysers & Gazzola, 2007, Völlm et al., 2006; Mitchell, Banaji, & 
Macrae, 2005).
THE FUNCTION OF THE MEDIAL PREFRONTAL CORTEX IN EMOTIONS 
AND EMPATHY
Affective and cognitive information are strongly interconnected, especially in 
empathy. Empathic processes use information of emotional states, as well as 
cognitive information as the TOM (Decety, 2011). Considering their similar functions 
and their interdependence it seems likely that emotion and TOM processing share 
functional regions which will be described in this review.
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The mPFC controls basic emotions
Although it has been repeatedly shown that the mPFC seems to play a role in higher 
cognitive functions as the TOM (see for example Fletcher et al., 1995; Frith & Frith, 
1999; Castelli, Happe, Frith, & Frith, 2000; Völlm et al, 2006) and response selection 
when several choices are possible (Rushworth, 2008), it is also strongly involved in 
controlling basic emotional reactions. 
 Previous animal research suggested that the mPFC is functionally connected 
to the limbic system (Diorio, Viau, and Meaney, 1993; Milad, Vidal-Gonzalez & 
Quirk, 2004). This was confirmed for humans by a study on fear regulation using 
fMRi (Ochsner, Brunge, Graff & Gabrieli, 2002). In this experiment, aversive pictures 
were presented while subjects should increase, maintain or decrease their emotional 
reaction to the pictures. To modulate their emotional reaction, subjects reappraised 
the emotional relevance of the stimulus. As reappraisal requires attention, a control 
condition was included in which subjects attended to the stimulus without altering 
their emotional reaction. Strong aversive pictures showed an increase in amygdala 
and insula activation. Amygdala activation was significantly higher during the 
control condition compared to reappraisal. Interestingly, the dorsal mPFC was 
the most active region for high emotional pictures using a reappraisal > attention 
contrast.  Similarly, a study by Zotev at al. (2011) revealed functional connectivity 
between the mPFC and the amygdala. Subjects had to decrease their amygdala 
activation  by retrieving positive autobiographical memories while receiving real-
time fMRI biofeedback of their amygdala. Post-processing showed a negative 
correlation between amygdala and mPFC activity which became stronger over 
training trials. 
 As the mPFC is important for emotion regulation it may also have a function 
in regulating emotional empathy which also recruits limbic areas. This assumption 
is supported by an fMRi experiment of Peelen, Atkinson, and Vuilleumier (2010) 
which demonstrated abstract emotional processing in the mPFC in response to 
social stimuli.  They observed brain activity in response to the perception of basic 
emotions across different modalities, including face movements, body movements 
and vocal intonations. Emotional categories included anger, disgust, fear, happiness 
and sadness and subjects rated the emotional intensity of each stimulus. Multivoxel 
pattern analysis revealed a differential activation of voxels in the mPFC between 
emotional categories. However, there was no difference between modalities. The 
perceived intensity of emotional stimuli was also not correlated to mPFC activation. 
Peelens’ (2010) experiment reveals important insight into the functional properties 
of the mPFC, namely that the mPFC is also active in perceiving other people’s 
emotions, based on a cognitive level as its activation is not influenced by the 
modality or emotional intensity.
The mPFC in self-conscious emotions
The emotional content of primary emotions is mainly focused on the own mental 
state and does not require an understanding of others or the self  (Lewis & Haviland-
Jones, 2000). During ontogeny, children have to develop a concept of the self to 
reach the next level of emotional development. Once achieved, the self-conscious
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emotions develop, which are empathy, envy, embarrassment, pride, shame and guilt 
(see for example Slater & Lewis, 2002). Additionally to empathy, the mPFC seems to 
play a role in many of these emotions. In an fMRi study of Takahashi, Yahata, Koeda, 
Matsuda, and Asai (2004) subjects were instructed to read sentences with neutral, 
guilty or embarrassing content. The mPFC showed significantly higher activation in 
the guilt and embarrassment conditions compared to neutral sentences.  
 However, in a following study of Takahashi and colleagues subjects had to 
read sentences with joy or pride evoking contents (Takahashi, Matsuura, Koeda, 
Yahata, & Suhara, 2008). In contrast to the expectations, no activation of the mPFC 
was observed in both conditions. Concerning the joy condition it is reasonable that 
no mPFC activation was found because no social cognition, empathy or emotion 
regulation was required in this task and joy is no self-conscious emotion.
 Contrasting to Takahashi et al.’s (2008) results on pride, an fMRi study by 
Zahn et al. (2009) found mPFC activation in response to pride by using a more 
pronounced paradigm. In this study, subjects viewed sentences containing both 
the subject’s name and their best friend’s name. The sentences described either a 
behavior of the subject towards the friend (self-agency) or vice versa (other-agency). 
During scanning subjects rated sentences on how pleasant the depicted events 
were. After this, subjects labeled each sentence according to four possibilities:  Self-
agency in accordance with social values, other-agency in accordance with social 
values, self-agency counter to social values and other-agency counter to social 
values. Pride was defined as self-agency in accordance with social values and guilt 
as self-agency counter social values. The conditions used for analysis were therefore 
individual for each subject, depending on the subjects’ moral sentiments. Thereby, 
it was controlled for interindividual differences in moral evaluation of the situations. 
Results showed significant activation of the ventromedial PFC in pride vs. fixation 
and guilt vs. fixation. The disagreement between Takahashi’s (2008) and Zahn’s 
(2009) study may be caused by the fact that Takashi and colleagues predefined 
which sentences stimulate pride. This definition may deviate from the subject’s own 
evaluation of the stimulus.
The mPFC and cognitive control of affective and empathic reactions 
This section will describe the relationship between empathy and emotions 
concerning the function of the mPFC. The similarities of empathy-regulation and 
emotion-regulation will be related to the cognitive processes which are responsible 
for coordinating both.
The relationship between mPFC functioning in empathy and emotions
To investigate the role of the mPFC in empathy it seems valuable to compare 
emotion processing to empathy because the mPFC shows the following functions 
in both processes. First, the mPFC is a central structure in a network responsible 
for combining affective and cognitive information during emotions and empathy 
(Keysers & Gazzola, 2007; Decety, 2011; Kim & Hamann, 2007). Second, the mPFC 
is strongly connected to the emotional regions which are not only involved in affect 
production but also in empathy such as the amygdala and the insula (Milad et al., 
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2004; Chiba et al., 2001; Kim & Hamann, 2007; Preston & de Waal, 2002). Thirdly, 
the mPFC is directly involved in the processing of facial expressions (e.g. Mattavelli 
et al., 2011) and the TOM (Völlm et al., 2006) which is important for empathy and 
self-conscious emotions.  Fourthly, several independent approaches to empathy 
suggest a controlling function of higher cognitive regions including the mPFC on 
emotion sharing in empathy (Preston & de Waal, 2002; Decety 2011, Rizzolatti & 
Sinigaglia 2008). Similarly, during emotion regulation the mPFC is responsible 
for controlling emotional reactions (Ochsner et al., 2002; Zotev et al, 2010; Kim & 
Hamann, 2007; Decety & Jackson, 2004). Fifth, during social fear learning in rats 
a combination of emotional-motivational and empathic information produces a 
shared mPFC activation (Olsson & Phelps, 2007). 
Differentiating between empathy and emotions: The self-other distinction
Although empathy and emotions share several functional similarities they remain 
distinct processes. The distinction between empathy and emotions is of special 
importance for emotional empathy in which the emotional state of another 
person is simulated in the observer (de Waal, 2008). The question arises why this 
simulation is not confused with own emotions as in both processes the same regions 
are activated (see for example Singer et al., 2004). This question was addressed 
in a theoretical approach on empathy by Decety (2011) and Decety and Jackson 
(2004). Decety proposes three main mechanisms as bases for empathy, namely self 
regulation, emotion understanding and affective arousal/sharing of emotions. In 
this model, cognitive understanding of emotions includes perspective taking and 
TOM processes and is strongly related to the mPFC. Affective arousal describes 
automatic affective reactions to simple emotional stimuli and it is mainly performed 
by the limbic system. Sharing of these automatic reactions describes the taking over 
of another person’s emotion comparable to a mirroring mechanism. During self 
regulation the emotional reactions are regulated by cognitive processes in the mPFC 
to fit empathic response to the social context (Decety, 2011). However, it remains 
to be investigated which cognitive processes are involved in self regulation during 
empathy.  An important cognitive mechanism in this context is the distinction 
between the self and others because it ensures that empathic emotions are not 
confused with own emotions (Decety and Jackson, 2004). 
Interestingly, recent studies have suggested that the mPFC is important in 
distinguishing between the own mental state and the mental state of others. For 
example, in an fMRI experiment by Ochsner et al. (2004) subjects had to evaluate 
social-emotional pictures on three aspects. First, they had to judge their own 
emotional reaction to the picture. Second, they had to evaluate the emotional state 
of the central person of the picture. Third, they had to indicate whether the picture 
was taken inside or outside as baseline measurement. The results showed that the 
first and the second conditions activated the mPFC compared to the baseline. In 
condition one, sub-regions of the mPFC and the left temporal cortex were active, 
compared to condition two. In contrast, the left lateral prefrontal cortex (including 
Broca’s area), the medial frontal gyrus and the medial occipital cortex were activated 
in condition two. These findings suggest that the cognitive representations of the 
own and someone else’s emotional state rely on two distinct networks and that the
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 mPFC contributes to both. However, it remains unclear what the exact function of 
the mPFC is in this context (Ochsner et al., 2004).
Connections between the mPFC and the affective MNS
Interpreting Ochsner et al.’s (2004) findings with Decety and Jackson’s (2004) 
approach, the mPFC activation would discriminate between emotions and empathic 
reactions based on the self other distinction. By this, the mPFC would influence the 
activation of emotional core regions involved in empathy and emotions. 
 However, not only macro-anatomical structures but even the same neurons 
may be active during emotions and empathy. These neurons are defined as affective 
mirror neurons.  Potentially, affective mirror neurons could be found in every region 
that is active in empathy and emotions. It remains to be investigated whether 
affective mirror neurons exist and how the mPFC is connected to them. 
 This topic was addressed by an fMRi study by Schulte-Ruther and colleagues 
(2007) which indicates that the mirror neuron system (MNS) is related to the self-
other distinction in the mPFC.  In this study, subjects performed two different tasks 
with faces (either directed towards the observer or adverted by 45⁰) expressing 
anger, fear, sadness, disgust, happiness or no expression. In the other-task subjects 
indicated the emotional state of the person. In the self-task subjects indicated their 
own emotional reaction to the facial expression. An additional high level baseline 
condition included a gender and age decision task of neutral faces. Before scanning 
general empathy scores of the subjects were assessed by using the Balanced 
Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES) and the Empathic Concern Scale (ECS). There was 
no difference in activation across face emotions and the authors concluded that their 
paradigm only tested a general mechanism for face perception, not specific enough 
to activate different emotional representations. The results also showed that the left 
lateral orbito-frontal cortex, the mPFC, bilateral inferior frontal cortices, superior 
temporal sulci, temporal poles, and the right cerebellum were involved in both the 
“self” and the “other” task compared to baseline. The “self” compared to the “other” 
task differentially activated the mPFC (see also Heatherton et al., 2006). Significant 
activation differences between the self vs. other task were also found in the inferior 
frontal gyrus (see also Ochsner et al., 2004). Remarkably, the iFG activity correlated 
with empathy scores. Importantly related to these findings, Kilner and colleagues 
found evidence for motor mirror neurons in the inferior frontal gyrus (Kilner, Neal, 
Weiskopf, Friston, & Frith 2009). Taken together these studies reveal functional 
connectivity during empathy between the mPFC and regions related to the MNS 
based on the self-other distinction. 
 Furthermore, the activation of the mPFC in TOM tasks (Völlm et al., 2006) 
and its functional connectivity to other regions associated with the TOM (especially 
the STS and the temporal parietal junction) suggests a contribution of the self-other 
distinctions to the TOM (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Mitchell et al., 2005; Schulte-
Rüther et al., 2007). Therefore it seems plauslible that the TOM influences the MNS 
based on the self- other distinction (Schulte-Rüther et al., 2007). Other examples 
for connections between MNS related regions and the mPFC are reflected by 
projections from the mPFC to the insula and the anterior cingulate cortex (Chiba 
et al., 2001).  Remarkably, Hutchison, Davis, Lozano, Tasker, and Dostrovsky (1999)
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found evidence for aff ective mirror neurons in the human ACC using single cell 
recording.  During surgery in epileptic patients they delivered pain stimuli to the 
patients. A class of neurons was selective for pinprick stimuli and responded when 
the patient received the stimulus and also when they viewed the experimenter 
receiving the stimulus.  Furthermore, evidence for mirror neuron activity in the 
insula is based on fMRi studies by Wicker et al. (2003) and Singer et al. (2004).
Self-other distinction based regulation of emotions and empathy
To summarize the fi ndings presented in this paper, the author proposes the 
following model (see Figure 1). Most fundamentally, the mPFC is involved in 
controlling emotional reactions (Davidson., Putnam, & Larson, 2000; Diorio et al. 
1993) which are produced in emotional core regions such as the amygdala, insula 
and the cingulate cortex (Olsson & Phelps, 2007). Similarly, the mPFC regulates 
emotional empathy and possibly the aff ective MNS (Hutchison et al., 1999; Singer 
et al., 2004) based on the self-other distinction (Decety, 2011). The mPFC controls 
aff ective and empathic responses by distinguishing between the self and others. In 
accordance with this, various theories have  suggested that the self-other distinction 
controls aff ect processing by signalling whether an emotional response is internally 
or externally generated (i.e. the self-other distinction refl ects whether the current 
emotional reaction is produced by empathy or whether it is an own emotional 
reaction) (Schulte-Rüther et al., 2007; Keysers & Gazzola, 2007; Decety & Jackson, 
2004).
 The main function of the mPFC in the TOM is to compare self and other 
related information (Mitchell et al., 2005; Schulte-Rüther et al., 2007; Keysers & 
Gazzola, 2007). Evaluating the self in relation to others is crucial in self-conscious 
emotions and depends on the TOM (Takahashi et al., 2004; Takahashi et al., 
2008).  By evaluating the self in relation to others the mPFC activates emotional 
core regions such as the amydala and the cingulate cortex during self-conscious 
emotions (Ruby & Decety, 2003). The self-other distinction is therefore a crucial 
functional connection between cognitive and emotional information in empathy 
and emotions. This is in accordance with de Waals (2008) evolutionary approach to 
empathy, which states that the self-other distinction characterizes social cognition 
but also infl uences emotional empathy.
Figure 1. The self-other 
disti ncti on regulates emoti ons 
and empathy. 
The self-other disti ncti on 
diff erenti ates between empathy, 
emoti on regulati on and self-
conscious emoti ons. Emoti onal 
empathy shares regions with 
basic emoti onal reacti ons 
whereas social cogniti on is built 
on the self-other disti ncti on 
which is crucial for self-conscious 
emoti ons.
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CONCLUSION
Two distinct neural circuits form the neural basis of empathy (de Waal, 2008). The 
first pathway is used for fast reactions to social-emotional stimuli and contains 
the medial prefrontal cortex and basic emotional structures such as the amygdala 
and the insula. The second pathway contains prefrontal (including the medial 
prefrontal cortex) and cingulate cortex regions. The cortical pathway controls the 
automatic reactions of the first pathway based on cognitive processes (Olsson & 
Phelps, 2007). The mPFC is embodied in both pathways, suggesting that it is an 
important structure for connecting emotions and cognition.
 In this review the relationship between affective and cognitive information 
processing in the mPFC was analyzed. Cognitive processes in the mPFC seem 
to be fundamental for making self-other distinctions (Mitchell et al., 2005). 
Distinguishing between the self and others is crucial in the TOM, empathy and 
perspective taking (Mitchell et al, 2005; de Waal, 2008). It is further suggested, that 
the self-other distinction is crucial for controlling automatic subparts of empathy 
(Keysers & Gazzola, 2007). More precisely, recent studies suggest that the mPFC may 
control parts of the affective mirror neuron system (e.g. Schulte-Rüther et al, 2007). 
This seems necessary, because the affective response has to differ if an emotional 
reaction is one’s own emotion compared to a simulation based on mirror neuron 
activity (Decety & Jackson, 2004). Besides reactions to emotions of others, the 
mPFC also is active in regulating one’s own emotions and basic affective responses 
of sadness, disgust, fear and happiness (Milad et al., 2004; Kim & Hamann, 2007). 
Additionally, the mPFC and connected regions (especially the STS) are involved in 
self-conscious emotions by evaluating the self in relation to others based on the 
TOM (Takahashi et al., 2004; Takahashi et al., 2008).  Summarizing, the presented 
studies suggest a similar function of the mPFC and related subcortical regions in 
empathy/TOM and in emotions.  
 To verify the implementations of these conclusions further, mPFC activation 
should be compared between empathy/TOM and emotion regulation tasks. The 
influence of the mPFC on the human mirror neuron system should furthermore be 
observed in more detail, as there is much debate on the function of mirror neurons 
in empathy.
 In general, there is still much need for further research and finer theoretical 
differentiations. Firstly, the mPFC can be subdivided in several functional subparts. 
Differences between ventral and dorsal sections of the mPFC seem crucial (Decety, 
2011) but also other differentiations should be taken into account.
Secondly, the cognitive level on which the mPFC operates remains undefined. For 
example a meta-analysis by Wager, Jonides, and Reading (2004) demonstrated the 
activation of the mPFC in different task-switching studies. Wager et al.’s meta-analysis 
compared task switching paradigms that used different types of task switching (e.g. 
switching attention between the shape vs. colour of an object or switching between 
two earlier learned rules which both applied to one object). mPFC activation was 
found in nearly all task switching types. Thus, the findings of Wager et al. suggest 
that the mPFC contributes to the switching between abstract mental sets in general. 
However, it remains to be specified how these content independent processes are
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related to emotion processing. 
 Thirdly, the studies presented in this review mainly focus on the mPFC. 
Although the mPFC seems to be the crucial structure in this context, probably 
many other regions are involved. As the STS is strongly connected to the mPFC and 
involved in the TOM and self-conscious emotions it could be another structure of 
interest (Takahashi et al., 2004).   Furthermore, the iFG remains a region of special 
interest as it is related to the MNS (Kilner et al., 2009) but also active during self 
conscious-emotions (Simon-Tomas et. al, 2011).
 Fourthly, it remains unclear to what extent empathy is based on affective-
mirroring systems or motor-mirroring systems. Therefore, the research on the 
human mirror neuron system should be interpreted more carefully. For example, 
many studies claim to demonstrate mirror neurons but only find a common activation 
of one region. However, a common activation of a region does not imply that the 
same neurons are active although several studies interpret it that way (Schulter-
Rüther, 2007).  This is mainly due to the fact that fMRI lacks the spatial resolution 
to investigate mirror neurons directly. As single cell recording can only rarely be 
used in humans, inferences on human mirror neurons are indirect by using TMS, 
fMRI with adaption paradigms (Kilner et al., 2009) or multivariate pattern analysis 
(Schulte-Rüther et al., 2007) which is in state to reveal sub-voxel activation (Mur, 
Bandettini & Kriegeskorte, 2009). Remarkably, the study mentioned by Hutchison 
demonstrated affective mirroring activity by using single cell recording in humans 
(Hutchison et al., 1999). It also has to be mentioned that the concept of mirror 
neurons is not necessary for self-other distinction based regulation of empathy 
as the distinction may control different neural populations within a functional 
area. Furthermore, it remains to be analyzed in how far single neuron activity is 
informative to investigate complex social processes as they probably recruit a huge 
amount of distributed neural populations.  Nevertheless, it is crucial to clarify the 
existence of affective mirror neurons to understand the neural basis of empathy.
 Finally it has to be mentioned that the content of this review describes a 
fundamental problem for every topic in neuroscience that deals with emotion; that 
the influence of cognitive information on affective information is widely undefined 
(Lemerise & Arsenio, 2000). This review presents potential regions and cognitive 
processes which could contribute to this issue.
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